Desicritics Category: Politics: War on Terror

Shaikh Dr Tahir ul-Qadri Issues Anti-Terrorism Fatwa Without Teeth

Jamal — Thu, 4 Mar 2010 16:16:45 EST

Regarding Shaikh Dr Tahir ul-Qadri’s Anti-Terrorism Fatwa, recently launched in London, I guess any steps forward in fighting terrorism should be considered a good thing. However, these initiatives can be read in many ways and I’ll give you a few points off the top of my head, replicates what many others are thinking in the Muslim community.

Firstly, I doubt this will have the clout envisaged by one of it's apparent key promoters the Quilliam foundation (a counter-terrorism think tank) as the fatwa itself does not have the unanimous backing of the most prominent scholars and Sheikhs, although the opinions and rulings of some prominent scholars do appear to have been involved in drawing it up. Also this is not the first fatwa to condemn suicide bombings/terrorism, and Qadri is not the first ‘important/eminent’ Sheikh to issue such a fatwa, as many more prominent scholars and Sheikhs have done so already, and these are ignored by those idiots that seek to commit suicide bombings and terrorism anyway. Furthermore, most Islamic scholars and Imams have already consistently condemned killing people in the name of Islam for a long, long time. There is simply minimal publicity about these earlier efforts and therefore the time spent promoting Shaikh Dr Tahir ul-Qadri’s Anti-Terrorism Fatwa would have been better spent promoting that Muslims have already been condemning terrorism for some time.

Secondly, regarding Qadri's status, the Sheikh in question appears to head a Sufi organisation and as such there will be many branches of the Muslim community that will not recognise his rulings. In fact, its likely that most of his own followers will accept his fatwa but then as his followers they are likely to not support terrorism or suicide bombings anyhow. Furthermore, another reason he is not a universally accepted figure by all individuals and branches of the Muslim community is because in the past has made segregating comments about some other Muslim communities such as Wahabbis and Deobandis. So I’d suggest that this fatwa is not really groundbreaking apart from inside his own organisation and will never be widely acknowledged apart from by his own followers.

Thirdly, although it is important that such a Fatwa has been publicised, the importance and reach perceived by the press, Quilliam foundation, etc, does appear overrated/overestimated. Why? Because those that commit such crimes have already heard existing Fatwa’s stating it to be wrong and ignore them, those that do not recognise this Sheikh would have already heard existing Fatwa’s stating it to be wrong, those that follow this Sheikh should already be clear terrorism is wrong and do not need a Fatwa to tell them this, and those non-followers that already know it to be wrong do not need another Fatwa to remind them.

I’ve read a cross-section of interesting views which collectively place this Fatwa in it’s correct context and weight it’s relevance.

"The fatwa, running to 600 pages, has been written by Muhammad Tahir ul-Qadri, founder and leader of a Muslim sect based in Pakistan, and highlighted in a press release from the Quilliam Foundation, an anti-extremism thinktank which last year received £1m funding from the British government." (Guardian)

"It (the fatwa) plays on a widely-held (and sometimes willful) misperception that Muslim leaders have not spoken out against Islamist violence. Large numbers of Muslim leaders have denounced violence, suicide bombs, 9/11, 7/7 and many other bloody attacks by Islamist radicals (check out a long partial list here)." (Reuters)

"Tim Winter, a lecturer in Islamic studies at Cambridge University, said while ul-Qadri’s step of declaring "miscreants as unbelievers" was unusual, it was unlikely extremists would take notice of his edict." (Al Jazeera)"I dont think any Muslim will disagree with his fatwa .. Whoever has killed an innocent human beings regardless of religion , colour , race , nationality is a terrorist. At the same time he should have mentioned American and its allies are also terrorists (including govt of pakistan ). They have also killed millions of innocent human beings in Iraq , Afganistan … We cant say one side is terrorist and other is fighting for so called democracy." (Islamonline forum)

"The scholars of K.S.A have been condemning terror and issuing fatwas since the 70’s (maybe even before then) and no one took any notice…" …"The barelvis and assorted sufi councils are flavour of the month with the UK government to spread division, hate and doubt among Muslims." (Ummah.com forum)

"What’s funny is that the Government have money to waste in what’s supposed to be a recession. They give money to the Quilliam Foundation to elicit fatwas from men who have virtually no influence on the Muslims in the UK. How ironic that these munafiq "scholars" are seen as a joke by the very Muslims they are meant to be deradicalising." (Islamic Awakening forum)

So thinking more about the 'Qadri Fatwa' and The Quilliam foundation there are some concerns that need to be raised.The Quilliam foundation is headed by Ed Husain, a former religious extremist, and actually has minimal support from Muslims. I’ve said previously that his book, The Islamist appears to be another Wafa Sultan type attempt to profit off the back of Islamophobia and the fear of ‘Islamism’. As Craig Murray also has said, Husain has realized that, having tried to make a mark in the world through religious fanaticism, that he can make more money and career progress by instead jumping on the anti-Islamist gravy train.

When Husain’s not traveling the world lecturing on the threat of ‘Islamist ideology’, he benefits from the fact that the UK government has had Ed Husain up in the Quilliam foundation and has thrown more than £1 million of taxpayers’ money at it.

It’s about time the public (including Muslims) begin questioning and criticizing these self-proclaiming fatwa writers and the barrage of advice they give to the police and security agencies on counter-extremism methods that only serve to further demonise and stereotype Muslims.

Technology Lapses

Halima Khan — Wed, 3 Mar 2010 10:36:09 EST

The tools of the information age which were once welcomed as a great step forward for mankind are now progressively more so being turned into weapons in the "war on terror." For instance, the G8 countries in recent times approved to integrate biometric passports based on microchips or databases that predetermine physical characteristics such as facial dimensions, fingerprints, iris patterns and voice patterns. More than a few governments are operational in attaining, developing, and linking databases of personal information. Subsequently they will build up on data mining software to verify "signatures" of terrorist movement.

It is argued that these intricate information systems engage artificial constructions of the "terrorist" which are too complex for any single human being to comprehend, yet too reducing to serve as a dependable basis for suspicion. Additionally, sanctioning high technology to categorize suspects complicates the matter of liability and responsibility for what is already being practiced in a relatively low-tech approach: the detention, deportation, and even torture of suspects presumed guilty of terrorist association.

The role of information technology in countering terrorism in an era of globalization can itself come under question. Modern terrorism has been typified as a negative comeback to globalization, but at the same time, terrorism has become so effectual by exploiting the very engines of globalization itself. The role of information technology in fighting terrorism, especially intelligence analysis comes fully loaded with the legal challenges that lie as consequence. It takes a network to fight a network, an analyst puts very rightly. But then it takes a network to create a counterfeit network as well.

Information technology is at the heart of both modern terrorism and globalization. Globalization has distorted the distinction between international and domestic terrorism. Terrorism became strictly global in the late 1960s, with the arrival of cheap commercial intercontinental airline travel and international communications. Not accidentally, cheap intercontinental travel and international communications are two of the engines driving globalization and aiding terrorism. Terrorists veil their planning and preparation in a sea of global noise, but a well-resourced terrorist faction has a global scope, span, and presence, withholding no borders and jurisdictions. Terrorists have revealed an ability to exploit information technology. Many have hypothesized that terrorists may soon begin targeting information technology itself, as well as using it as a weapon, for instance with attacks against decisive infrastructures and cyber terrorism. To tackle these issues sufficiently, technology and law must be urbanized in parallel, with mutual respect for each other. This is unprecedented, but indispensable, if a balance is to be maintained in civil security, civil and economic liberty, and technological progress.

Movie Review: My Name is Khan

Kishore — Mon, 15 Feb 2010 07:50:53 EST

Autism reminds me of Mark Haddon's masterpiece fiction The Curious Incident of the Dog in the Night-Time, where the protagonist - a 15 year old autistic child - embarks on an adventure to find the killer of his neighbor's dog. An autistic life with an impaired social interaction and restrictive communicative abilities is often subject to being misconstrued as mental retardation.

My Name is Khan is an extraordinary story of an autistic individual trying to harness his limited capabilities, his child-like intellect that makes him travel across America to meet the President and win back the love of his wife. All of this happens while tensions are running high post 9/11 and individual muslims are victimized to being associated with terrorism. Rizvan Khan (SRK) is one among them, who is detained at the San Francisco Airport on the pretext of his Islamic surname - Khan.

In the real world, Shah Rukh Khan himself and Kamal Hassan have been afflicted by the anything-Islamic-is-everything-terror syndrome. SRK in Newark and Kamal Hassan in Toronto have been detained in the past because their surname sounded "suspicious" and so were "potential terrorists", let alone a possible number of unknown individuals who had to go through this.

The movie is very unkaranjoharly, and the most striking aspect is the simplicity of the story and its fluid narrative. It is often the lack of knowledge that hinders the natural existence of a person with autism. We are so used to the natural rhythms of our sensory impulses, that an understanding of this rare other side is sure to make you feel empathic towards those suffering from it. Niranjan Iyengar has certainly done his homework in understanding the autistic ways of communication - devoid of emotions, extremely factual botched with repetitive behavior. Not to mention, SRK's rendering of Niranjan's dialogs are delivered to perfection.

Kajol plays Mandira, the mother of the child that becomes a victim of campus racial abuse during the post 9/11 chaos, also Rizvan's wife, and is at her vintage best. Years of break of cinema has not dithered her charm and expressions any bit, and she puts together another memorable performance.

In a world that associates Karan Johar with sentimental family soaps and tearful climaxes, My Name is Khan only goes to show that K Jo is capable of dealing with complicated topics like Autism, 9/11 and terrorism and can still manage to present the story as a simple no-frills movie that is both entertaining and moving.

Technology Betrayal

Halima Khan — Sun, 14 Feb 2010 07:55:17 EST

A two-edged Sword is how it was and how it still is; technology is a blessing that turns into a nuisance without much warning. The War on Terror has been an ongoing activity since a fateful September 11. It has been waged in areas some experts pronounced as the hub of terrorism. Technology is an unparalleled weapon. However not only for the good side; it is available on both sides. This is where this whole War on Terror business gets tricky. And messy too!

It is unanimously agreed that this is the age of information technology with tools infinite with power uncontainable and global reach. As the War on Terror ensues, technology is more frequently leaned on to tilt the balance in favor. This advantage exists for both those who are waging the War and also those against. This to some extent goes to make a little clearer on why this war has been more or less in a deadlock. America’s unparalleled superiority in technology is considered supreme in maintaining homeland security just as it is considered absolute in the War on Terror. What is sometimes ignored is the implementation of particular technologies is important, but in the course of this struggle this information soon reaches the other side as well. Once the information has reached the other side and its understanding is achieved, they manage to either foil it or brainstorm a counterattack. Thus the technology is more or less fallible, even useless. The technology assessment of costs, benefits, effectiveness, impacts, economic brunt, human value, society is all washed down.

The technology related to War on Terror can vastly be divided into three categories. Technology concerning to precluding or detecting terrorist acts is continuously updated and tested for potential break-ins. As continuously it is being attempted to over rule these bars and void this security tactic. Then there is technology detecting when terrorist activities occur. Lastly, technology is put to use to cope with consequences of terrorist activities.

This vicious cycle hasn’t reached a concluding point and doesn’t seem to be going near one either. Perhaps this is why talks of negotiations are in the air. Finally, someone seems to be realizing war is war and it can never be good for humanity.

Drones for Pakistan - a Potential Game Changer

jay — Mon, 25 Jan 2010 09:26:32 EST

Soon after the US Defense Secretary Robert Gates left India's shores last week for Pakistan, came the announcement that the US was considering offering UAVs (Unmanned Aerial Vehicles popularly called drones) to Pakistan. This was supposedly to appease Pakistan to get them to join the US' war against al-Qaeda (see the New York Times story here).

Although the drone technology being provided is meant to be used against al-Qaeda it does not require a long stretch of imagination to see where it will end up getting used eventually - against India. It is appalling how neither the Indian establishment nor the Indian press has made any noise about this particular handout from the US to Pakistan considering the immense game changing quality of this deal.

Drones are essentially unmanned aircrafts the latest of which can fly for more than 2000 miles, stay unobtrusively at an altitude of about 3 kilometers and stay put in its position for even up to 14 hours. The latest advanced versions are able to sense the heat of human beings on earth from that height and precisely destroy something as small as a car from that height using Hellfire missiles with much less collateral damage than an F-16 would. These are therefore highly preferred by the Obama administration to eliminate terrorists in Pakistan, the most high-profile recent casuality being Beitullah Masud. The drone program is considered to be so successful that Mr. Obama has authorized more predator killings in hist first ten months than what Bush did in 3 years.

What is all the more striking about this is that being unmanned, these are actually controlled by operators who could be sitting anywhere in the world. According to experts, more questions about what it means to be "at war" is being raised due to this program. The operators of these drones are very often suburban home dwellers who drive down to their office for an 8 hour war from an air conditioned office (much like a video game) and then go home for dinner to their family. It is not clear how the concept of "being at war" itself will change with this kind of technology.

Admittedly, the US is wary of providing this technology to any other country as it provides them a military superiority over anyone else in the world. What they are offering Pakistan is only the surveillance technology and not the firing capability. However, this first step itself is going to introduce an inequality between India and Pakistan. Pakistan will now gain the capability to intrude into Indian airspace without being detected. And its Air Force will gain knowledge of the technology which is just one step behind the Predator missile-enabled technology.

From the deafening silence with which this news is being greeted by the Indian establishment, it is clear that the Indians were probably told and their acquiescence sought by the US before this offer was made. Perhaps that was one of the items in the agenda of Mr. Gates' visit last week. If so, it is a shame that India has agreed to this deal without thinking through the consequences. This is like the old Arabian tale of the camel and the sheikh. We are letting the camel just enough room to get his head into the tent to make him more comfortable. It won't be long before he occupies the whole tent throwing the sheikh out.

For more details on the Predator program, robotic warfare in general, and its consequences, here is an excellent book by P.W. Singer: Wired for War.

It Takes Intelligence to Review & Deliver Intelligence

Dr Bhaskar Dasgupta — Fri, 8 Jan 2010 21:20:21 EST

This is the most amazing and honest report I have read. This Major General (U.S. Major General Michael Flynn) has shown huge courage to be brutally honest about the intelligence failings in the Afghan campaign and typically the press reports and the Pentagon have dumped on him. This is one reason the USA and its allies will win, because they learn (at least I hope they do). I would also hope that his maverick behaviour does not end up harming him, but given the courage and intelligence shown by General Petraeus and General McChrystal, his two respective bosses, I think not. But let us get back to the report and what a report it is! It is brutally honest. It cuts across the fog of organisational chaos by the ton and homes in directly, in a few short pages, on exactly where the problem is, giving some examples of where they are going right now and what they need to do.

But first the background. This report was written by the Head of Military Intelligence of the US forces in Afghanistan as a review report on how intelligence gathering is happening, what the objectives are, what the drawbacks are, and how to improve the procedures so it benefits the senior military leaders and the political masters.

Reading this report will also help the generals and ministers of any other country currently facing an insurgency or dealing with a terrorist campaign. If you look at Thailand, India, Pakistan, China, etc., they all need to read this report.

However, it is not only a must read for those, but actually also for those who are also facing not just direct insurgency campaigns. Are the people in the United Kingdom who are being faced with a domestic British Muslim terrorist campaign reading this? Are they adapting the lessons learnt from Afghanistan in this intelligence evaluation report with respect to the Islamic societies in British Universities and the mosques in the UK? The quiet neighbourhood doctor or engineer who is secretly planning to blow up a building or nightclub? How are the links between the society, the mosques, the press, the NGOs, the charities, the police, MI5 & MI6 and the ministers being managed?

I don’t think this is only applicable to terrorism or the military. I think this is equally applicable to big firms and financial institutions. Here’s a question you can ask any grand poobah of strategy or CEO or head of planning. Do they have a strategy for collecting product, customer, market, country, regulator, and other types of information which is relevant to what head of the business needs to know? Have they ever run a review akin to what this report does? How do they know the mass of information being produced at the coalface (and believe you me, there is a whole load of information that is produced - ranging from product information, customer details, trading details, supply chain information, contact reports and emails, etc. )? How are they aggregated, distributed, sliced, fed up, sideways and down the chain? I quote from the report:

“Creating effective intelligence is an inherent and essential responsibility of command. Intelligence failures are failures of command – [just] as operations failures are command failures.”

In other words, if you as a senior manager are not getting sufficient information, then the responsibility of getting that information is yours, not somebody else’s and you need to take responsibility for this The execution, however, can be done by your head of MI, sales, COO, etc. etc.

There are absolute gems hidden in this report, which again have implications for both the military and civilian businesses. I am going to quote them and try to comment on them to clarify what I mean.

The second inescapable truth asserts that merely killing insurgents usually serves to multiply enemies rather than subtract them. This counterintuitive dynamic is common in many guerrilla conflicts and is especially relevant in the revenge-prone Pashtun communities whose cooperation military forces seek to earn and maintain. The Soviets experienced this reality in the 1980s, when despite killing hundreds of thousands of Afghans, they faced a larger insurgency near the end of the war than they did at the beginning.

This is far too common. Just measure the number of body bags (as was done in Vietnam), or the number of meetings held with customers or the revenue per customer, etc, these are often metrics that are used to judge progress or performance. But is that really what the military or corporate strategy is? No, that’s not it. The military strategy is to provide security and allow or support a fairly stable governance in Afghanistan so the Taliban’s bent of ideology and governance backed by their rage boys cannot take root. Yes, there are other requirements as well, but the objective is not to kill the Taliban, but to take the moral, civil, economic and military ground away from them. This might mean (and does mean) popping off the relevant commanders and does include having fire-fights, but you don’t measure by this metric. One needs intelligence and analysis to supports decision making. Similarly on the business front, far too often metrics drive management and strategy. We need to grab customer loyalty. No, we want customers to not only give us their business, but help us get more business by recommending us to other customers. That cannot be achieved, managed and delivered by measuring the number of calls you make to the customer, it needs a much broader sense of information. Otherwise, what you will end with is a huge body count or a huge list of contact reports, but lose the war or the business.

What are the barriers in getting this information?

“The barriers to maximizing available intelligence are surprisingly few. The deficit of data needed by high-level analysts does not arise from a lack of reporting in the field. There are literally terabytes of unclassified and classified information typed up at the grassroots level. Nor, remarkably, is the often-assumed unwillingness to share information the core of the problem. On the contrary, military officers and civilians working with ISAF allies, and even many NGOs, are eager to exchange information. True, there are severe technological hurdles, such as the lack of a common database and digital network available to all partners, but they are not insurmountable.

People often think that they need a giant new CRM system, network, or a database or that they have to establish big hairy governance bodies aligned with massive organisational transformation or dual / triple reporting lines. Not really, frankly that is rarely the problem. But it’s an easy solution, mind you, because it provides a concrete “something” that you can touch and deliver. Why do most of the business intelligence projects fail? They do because the fixation is on the damn system, database, network and not on the information or the culture or the strategy. An example where many of these issues have been resolved and fixed is the investment banking business, which is perhaps one of the most efficient legal sustainable moneymaking organisations known to man, with the exception of loan sharking or drug running or Ponzi trading. Data is always there, people LOVE to talk and give you information. But one needs to listen, read, review, pass up and down and sideways. See what the report says further:

The most salient problems are attitudinal, cultural, and human. The intelligence community’s standard mode of operation is surprisingly passive about aggregating information that is not enemy-related and relaying it to decision-makers or fellow analysts further up the chain. It is a culture that is strangely oblivious of how little its analytical products, as they now exist, actually influence commanders.
It is also a culture that is emphatic about secrecy but regrettably less concerned about mission effectiveness.1 To quote General McChrystal in a recent meeting, “Our senior leaders – the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Secretary of Defense, Congress, the President of the United States – are not getting the right information to make decisions with. We must get this right. The media is driving the issues. We need to build a process from the sensor all the way to the political decision makers.”

I would add another factor when discussing the impact on commercial firms. We have lost layers of middle management in the previous few decades, which has had an impact on the organisational ability to aggregate. I have nothing much further to add to the points above. Pretty self explanatory, no?

Nowhere does our group suggest that there is not a significant role for intelligence to play in finding, fixing, and finishing off enemy leaders. What we conclude is there must be a concurrent effort under the ISAF commander’s strategy to acquire and provide knowledge about the population, the economy, the government, and other aspects of the dynamic environment we are trying to shape, secure, and successfully leave behind. Until now, intelligence efforts in this area have been token and ineffectual, particularly at the regional command level. Simply put, the stakes are too high for the stability of Afghanistan and Pakistan, for NATO’s credibility, and for U.S. national security for us to fail in our intelligence mission. The urgent task before us is to make our intelligence community not only stronger but, in a word, “relevant.”

We are now faced with a set of very challenging, complex economic, social and political conditions across the world. This will require intelligence, information and data to be provided to managers - up and down the chain - in a significantly different manner. The firms which manage to crack this will win. I don’t have to tell you the changes that we are going to face in the next 3-5 years, but how to react to them? Well, a good management information, business intelligence, strategy and planning function can assist in doing this much better. In other words, yes, deal with the tactical bits, but don’t forget the strategy and the broader basis for analysis.

The example of Nawa was brilliant. Within the British area of operations, they were getting killed day in and day out. And the British thought the Americans knew nothing about COIN. Now look at what the Americans did. This might well be conflicting information and may be counted as national chest thumping, but by heck, the 1st Btn, 5th Marines gave an example of how to wage broad war. He quotes an example of how they avoided the issue of logistical problems.

The battalion intelligence officers refused to allow the absence of a data network to impede the flow of information. Each night, the deputy intelligence officer hosted what he called “fireside chats,” during which each analyst radioed in from his remote position at a designated time and read aloud everything learned over the last 24 hours. Using this approach, daily reports incorporated a wide variety of sources: unclassified patrol debriefs; the notes of officers who had met with local leaders; the observations of civil affairs officers; and classified HUMINT reports. The deputy intelligence officer typed up a master report of everything called in by analysts and closed each “chat session” by providing them with an updated list of questions – called “intelligence requirements” – for the companies to attempt to answer.
In the earliest days of the operation, many of these questions dealt with basic logistical matters, such as the location and conditions of roads, bridges, mosques, markets, wells, and other key terrain. Once these were answered, however, the focus shifted to local residents and their perceptions. What do locals think about the insurgents? Do they feel safer or less safe with us around? What disputes exist between villages or tribes? As the picture sharpened, the focus honed in on identifying what the battalion called “anchor points” – local personalities and local grievances that, if skillfully exploited, could drive a wedge between insurgents and the greater population. In other words, anchor points represented the enemy’s critical vulnerabilities.

Please note the second paragraph above. This shows that a smart intelligence officer (or a BI person in a corporation) understand the value of time. The same questions will not be asked all the time, there is an element of time, and things move on, questions change, the environment changes, you build on what you have got, evolve your strategy and questions. This means that it’s a learning organisation. It’s an important point which is often forgotten, that just when you have found the answer to the question, somebody goes and changes the question. Your organisation should have the ability to understand this, crack this an be able to handle these changes and then evolve to answer the changed question.

The report then moves into a detailed discussion of how the recommendations will work out in the Afghan theatre, which is very much unique to Afghanistan, presuming he knows more than I on the situation on the ground and will not comment more on this part. However, the organisation that he is suggesting is eerily similar to how commercial organisations are also setup. It might be an idea for commercial analysts to check back or back-test their MI or BI organisation and operating model against this. It might give them some ideas.

Like the NGO’s mentioned on page 20, the investor relations department and the corporate communications department could benefit from these organisational and operating model recommendations. They frequently need this information for the analysts, the shareholders, the regulators, press, etc. etc. Good information like this will almost certainly have a definite impact on the stock price and on the reputational risk of the firm.

So what do you do? I loved this quote:

Doing so will require important cultural changes. Analysts must absorb information with the thoroughness of historians, organize it with the skill of librarians, and disseminate it with the zeal of journalists.

Brilliant! This is an absolutely stonking formulation. It’s pretty straightforward and you know immediately what you need to do. We know what historians, librarians and journalists do and we can relate to that function.

There’s another great comment:

The format of intelligence products matters. Commanders who think PowerPoint storyboards and colour-coded spreadsheets are satisfactory for describing the Afghan conflict and its complexities have some soul-searching to do. Sufficient knowledge will not come from slides with little more text than a comic strip. Commanders must demand substantive written narratives and analyses from their intel shops and make the time to read them. There are no shortcuts. Microsoft Word, rather than PowerPoint, should be the tool of choice for intelligence professionals in a counterinsurgency

I was perhaps one of the worst offenders for PowerPoint use, but over the past 4-5 years, I have realised the value of a word document. It forces people to think about what they are writing and arguing about, especially for senior management. People spend hours and days mucking around with graphics and fancy animation when a short summary of one-page distils things down. This forces people to think about what are they trying to achieve, what decision they want their audience to take and whether the information they are providing is enough to help them take that decision?

Here’s another interesting point:

Historical lessons run the risk of sounding portentous, but disregarding them comes at a high price. History is replete with examples of powerful military forces that lost wars to much weaker opponents because they were inattentive to nuances in their environment. A Russian general who fought for years in Afghanistan cited this as a primary reason for the Soviet Union’s failures in the 1980s

History is indeed a vast early warning system and people who forget the lessons of history are condemned to repeat them. I know, I know, you are going to tell me that nobody has ever won in Afghanistan, not in any war, at any time, but hey, guess what? They didn't do the nuances either. Think about how the Mughal Empire managed to rule over Afghanistan for such a long time. They were not locals, they were invaders as well, so if pointing to the British and Soviets as a reason for saying that NATO will lose in Afghanistan, one should realise that the Mughals did win.

While we are not adopting the Mughal way of conquest and rule, the reason I think we will win is because we have Generals who have the courage to write reports like this, others who have the patience to read it, the confidence to realise that we are going down a wrong route and the humility to make changes. As it so happens, the US Secretary of Defence has now stated that he loves the report and would like to see the recommendations implemented. Sometimes being a maverick helps.

All this to be taken with a grain of salt.

Jihad and the Indian Home Minister

Dr Bhaskar Dasgupta — Sat, 2 Jan 2010 08:48:55 EST

Sometimes I worry about our chattering political classes, specially about their grasp of basic funda’s relating to history, culture, politics and religion. Anyway, seems like our Indian Home Minister Chidambaram spoke (here is another report from a Muslim newspaper) at the Intelligence Bureau Centenary celebrations. The main bits which bewildered me are, and I quote:

The home minister also referred to the rise of a new kind of threat. He said, "Just as the Cold War came to an end, we witnessed the emergence of another kind of war, namely, jihad. Jihad is a war or struggle against non-believers and, currently, it is waged by a number of groups owing allegiance to Islam. Unlike the original Crusades, jihad is not fought like conventional war. Jihad employs terror as an instrument to achieve its objectives. The tactics of jihadis have been copied by militants belonging to other groups too, not excluding militants professing the Hindu faith."

There are so many things wrong with this statement (if correct, I have not been able to access a transcript of his speech). Let's see where all he went off the rails.

1. Jihad is not a war, it can only be termed as a religiously mandated observance. To confuse it with a political and military phenomena, which is the commonly known western sense of the word i.e. war, is seriously deficient and lacking. The word itself is a noun, meaning Struggle and you are supposed to struggle against your own weaknesses of the self (meaning to become better), to guard against bad or false utterances, guard against violence and the struggle with the sword. One can wage war based upon strict criteria (although these criteria can vary and this is the crux of the matter) against apostates, criminals, to defend the Islamic state, to expand the state, rebel against bad rulers, etc. etc. The wiki entry is a reasonably good overview of this topic.

2. The Crusades. Ah, another spectacular silly comment. The crusades were not war. If at all, then that was the Christian Jihad. At least as far as the religious angle is concerned. Various Christian Popes and rulers went about saying that the holy land had to be liberated and it was the Christian duty of the faithful to go about chucking out the infidels. Then the Muslims waged their Muslim Jihad on the Christian Jihad. Very confusing but war it wasn't. This was two religions having it out based upon their respective religious rulings. Here is a good site on how the Muslims viewed Crusades and this is a good book on it. Here’s a nice site from the Christian side.

3. War as we understand it is carried out between two recognised entities, and can be a civil war between two populaces, a war against something like drugs, a war against an idea like poverty or illiteracy, etc. etc. But we generally recognise wars between two countries or states, waged by armies in uniform, with a relatively formal beginning (with firing of a shot) and end (like signing a surrender or ceasefire agreement). It has force of law based upon what cannot be done rather than what its components are. The whole legal paraphernalia and edifice around war crimes (Hague, Geneva, Nuremberg, UN Tribunals and now the International Criminal Court) defines what cannot be done in terms of war. And the crusades definitely were not war, even if you want to apply current thinking to a medieval phenomena like the Crusades.

4. Terror. Again a silly formulation by the minister. Terrorism has 10.2 million definitions at the last count. By and large, they contain words like “use of violence”, “for political or religious or or or purposes”, “against a state or civilians”, etc. etc. But what actually counts on the ground is the definition as included in the Law of the various countries. See here for a good list of these laws.

5. Jihad utilising terror as an instrument. Now this is quite contentious. But if the understanding is that of #4 above, then by and large, that is not agreed upon by the majority of Muslim Jurists as shown by a very large number of jurists who have expressed their views on this. It is pretty much clear that the majority of Jurists do not think that terrorism (as defined by modern day law and usage) is allowed under Jihad.

So you might as well as ask, where on earth are these fundamentalists getting their religious justification from? Well, if one has to point to one source (and believe you me, there are tons of other sources), the original root lies in the time when the Mongols rampaged through the Middle East. A chap called as Imam Ibn Taymiyyah released his famous fatwa on Jihad. Here is the English version of the same and this fatwa, via Banna, Qutb, Maududi and others have come down to the current fundos in Al Queda, LeT and other assorted Mujahedeen’s. The main section is and I quote:

Since lawful warfare is essentially jihad and since its aim is that the religion is God’s entirely [2:189, 8:39] and God’s word is uppermost [9:40], therefore, according to all Muslims, those who stand in the way of this aim must be fought. As for those who cannot offer resistance or cannot fight, such as women, children, monks, old people, the blind, handicapped and their likes, they shall not be killed, unless they actually fight with words [e.g. by propaganda] and acts [e.g. by spying or otherwise assisting in the warfare]. Some [jurists] are of the opinion that all of them may be killed, on the mere ground that they are unbelievers, but they make an exception for women and children since the constitute property for Muslims. However, the first opinion is the correct one, because we may only fight those who fight us when we want to make God’s religious victorious. God, Who is exalted, has said in this respect: "And fight in the way of God those who fight you, but transgress not: God loves not the transgressors." [The Qur’aan, 2:190]……………….

The Sharee`a [shari'a] enjoins fighting the unbelievers, but not the killing of those who have been captured. If a male unbeliever is taken captive during warfare or otherwise, e.g. as a result of a shipwreck, or because he lost his way, or as a result of a ruse, then the head of state (imam) may do whatever he deems appropriate: killing him, enslaving him, releasing him or setting him free for a ransom consisting in either property or people [freeing Muslim captives in return]. This is the view of most jurists and it is supported by the Koran and the Sunna.

As you can see, there are some exclusions and the terrorists use it to appeal to their supporters. Here’s a very good overview of how Ibn Taymiyyah’s fatwa and work has fed its way down to the fundos. But there is obviously a tension between the mainstream view and the terrorists view. Here’s a good overview of this tension. And in particular, if by this time you have not fallen asleep and are still facing problems in comprehending, read this rebuttal from Zawahiri. Warning, it's a book and pretty heavy going. That said, fatwas like this can cause confusion amongst the ranks. Coming from Darul Uloom Deoband means that it is respected.

Now, not having view of the transcript, I cannot say if the minister was right or wrong, but he was speaking from the perspective of the terrorist groups, well, then from their perspective, Jihad does have elements of terror, I am afraid.

6. Finally we come to the point he is making in terms of Hindu militants copying the tactics. Now this is a bit ambivalent. Reading for example Sarvarkar’s book Hindutva (which presumably would be the closest you can get to an ideological book), he talks about Hindutva relying on geographical unity, racial unity and common culture. But while he bangs on about Hinduism, nowhere does he reference any actual religious book to bolster his arguments, thereby giving me the impression that he is talking culture rather than religion, which applies to the notion of Jihad then as well. So that’s a crucial difference but on the other hand, terrorist tactics relating to propaganda, funding, violence against civilians, for political purposes, yes, he totally brought that on board. Here’s a good overview of the ideology and tactics underlying this Hindutva business.

But his other comments were weird and for such a sensitive topic, I am surprised that he spoke so loosely.

Modern Terrorism & The Christian Insurgency in Islamic Spain

Dr Bhaskar Dasgupta — Thu, 31 Dec 2009 13:22:55 EST

I was having a chat about Arabic conquests with an Egyptian friend and said, well, you are an Arab. He got very upset about it and said he aint Arab, no way Jose. (He is..). Anyway, so we got talking about early Islamic history and we discussed how the edges of the Islamic Empire generally fought off the imperialistic shackles. Here’s an example of the geographic spread.

It's in the area of southern Europe and India where the resistance seems to be most ferocious and ultimately they did throw off the imperialistic yoke to “assume” their older civilisation. But Northern Africa, the Middle East, Iran and Central Asia became Muslim. I remembered reading an interesting paper on this topic, specially related to Spain and thought of giving a quick overview.

The loss of Spain and India seems to have seared the psyche somehow as you can still hear the fundos complain bitterly about the loss of these two territories and maintain that they will win them back again (see below). But while the story of India is well known, it's only the loss of the Spanish kingdom by the Moors that is known. Nobody knows much about what happened after the invincible armies of the Moors rolled over North Africa into Spain and then into southern France till they were stopped by Charles Martel. After the Islamic kingdom was created and formed in Spain, what then? What happened in the immediate aftermath? We know about the reconquista, but what about the intervening period?

This paper sheds some more light on what happened. The first reason for the success of the resistance was the negation of the use of cavalry by the Muslim forces up in the mountainous region. Without the quick ability to move around the battlefield, the Muslim forces suffered serious casualties and were simply unable to push through to their ultimate conquest of the total peninsula. Also waging war in the mountains is a disaster for the attacking forces and all the advantages lie with the defenders.

The second problem was the inequitable distribution of booty and this caused severe fighting amongst the Muslim nobles. Booty and looting is an accepted part of the Islamic laws of warfare, but then those lovely laws cannot deal with the normal human greed. Time after time, whether in Spain or in the Ottoman Empire or in India, you find that the seeds for the disaster or downfall of the Islamic empire can be related to this factor. Also one has to remember that succession in most Muslim empires and kingdoms was a very bloody affair with siblings being slaughtered regularly. One can see this in the Moorish Kingdoms, in Ottoman times, in Egypt, in the Arab regimes or in the various assorted empires or kingdoms in South Asia. Not that the Christian kingdoms were not better with revolts, but they were less afflicted than the Muslims due to the steadily accepted primogeniture rule, which made the crucial difference.

It took 800 years or so before the Moors were pushed out, but push out they did. Time seems to have moved differently at that time. But then, this kind of time frame isn't surprising. Take Greece for example, the Ottomans went in by about the 13th century and were not chucked out till the 19th century.

How about the Mughal Empire? It started around 1500 and frankly didn't end till 1857 or so. Mind you, I just read an article which claimed that the British were responsible for the demise of the Mughal Empire. Actually, the Mughal Empire was pretty much dead much before the East India Company had anything to do with it, not least because of Aurangzeb’s administration and activities. What was left by 1857 was a pimple on the rump of the grand empire which was soon pricked.

So it takes time. The Christian rebels in Spain also benefited from the proximity of other Christian kingdoms from where they got their sustenance and support as well. Also, the Spanish resistance maintained their northern Christian kingdoms which ultimately provided the bedrock and bedspring from which the reconquista started.

The other factor which is common in these countries such as Spain, Greece and India was the strength of their respective beliefs. In other words, the local populace didn't give in to the blandishments of the Muslim conquerors and retained their faith. It is this factor which allowed the native population to resist and ultimately overthrow the Imperialistic invaders unlike in Arab and other lands where they gave up. Quite an interesting paper which sheds light on the very early days of the reconquista. Without this period of resistance, one can well imagine that Spain could well have followed in the same footsteps of Algeria, Egypt, etc. who became Muslim countries (although that comment about Egyptians not being Arab is interesting, I might return to that argument sometime)

Which leads me to the second interesting paper. Why is Spain so important to the fuglies? The abstract quotes:

The purpose of this article is to look at the importance and treatment that Spain receives in jihadist propaganda. This study offers a series of empirical observations based on a content analysis of a sample of propaganda produced by jihadist groups between January 1994 and September 2008. The analysis of this material, the context in which it was spread, and a comparison with other Western countries leads to the conclusion that the role played by this country in jihadist propaganda can only be understood by taking into account “structural factors” that have little to do with a greater or lesser level of interference in “Islamic affairs.”

Out of the 2233 documents that the researchers studied, Spain appeared in 2.3% of them, USA in 67%, UK in 5%, Russia in 3%, France in 2.7% and Israel in 14.2%. In particular, the issue of Al Andalus seems to be seared into their psyche. I quote:

In this category have been grouped all the mentions made that refer to the period of Muslim occupation of the Iberian peninsula, understood as between the invasion begun from the north of Africa in 711 until the elimination of the last Islamic redoubt in Spain in 1492 with the taking of the Kingdom of Granada by the Catholic Monarchs. This is a period of history with a profound evocative power in the Muslim collective imaginary. To use the term “Al Andalus” implies speaking about a past of artistic, architectural, literary, and scientific brilliance, but also implies speaking of a period of greater Islamic political power. Said term forms part of the conceptual baggage for all of the world's Islamic population, independently of the degree of religious practice, political affiliation, or attitudes toward terrorist violence. This remembrance has a character of yearning, of lament and pain for the loss of a territory that symbolized the highest level of splendor of Muslim civilization.
This remembrance of a painful episode for Islam is present in jihadist discourse. It is significant that the first mention of Spain on the part of bin Laden was precisely in these terms: “Let the whole world know that we shall never accept that the tragedy of Al Andalus will be repeated in Palestine.”
However, for Al Qaeda these allusions, far from constituting a mere rhetorical resource, acquire the character of an aggressive claim. For jihadist terrorism, the Iberian Peninsula is “dar al islam,” a land pertaining to the ummah, an Islamic land, taken and occupied by infidels. Jihadist terrorism incorporates among its objectives the “return” to Muslims of any land that at some time was under the control of Islam; it is a fight that must lead to the restoration of the original borders of the medieval Caliphate. According to Ayman al-Zawahiri: “Jihad seeks the liberation of Palestine, the entire country of Palestine and to liberate every land that used to be a territory of Islam, from Spain to Iraq.” This defining of the original and immovable boundaries of Islam has become a true “mantra” for Al Qaeda. Although it is true that this objective is seen as a long-term goal, and that first it will be necessary to complete a series of prior objectives of great importance, its repetition is replete with meaning in the sense that it sets out an unrenounceable goal for the jihadist movement. In fact, the “obsession” of Al Qaeda to recover the “lost Al Andalus” now forms a part of the discourse of the rest of the networks that integrate the jihadist constellation. Thus, for example, in a communiqu from April 2007 produced by Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb the following can be read: “By Allah, we will neither return our sword into its scabbard nor enjoy life until we liberate every Islamic land from [the hands of] the Crusaders, the apostates, and the collaborators, and until our ritually cleansed feet walk [once again] in the stolen [land of] Al Andalus and in desecrated Jerusalem.”…….
……Of equal importance is seeing how this aggressive demand has been incorporated into the ideology of groups geographically distant from Al Andalus, such as the Afghan Taliban. In June of that same year, the prominent Taliban leader Mansour Dadallah stated the following in an interview broadcast by Al-Jazeera: “Jihad will remain an individual duty incumbent upon us, until we regain Al Andalus and all the countries occupied by the infidels.” Regarding the Al Andalus category, it is an authentic exception among the “far enemy.” The jihadists make no territorial claims on any other Western nation, which leads to the amplification of the presence of Spain within the totality of communicative activity of jihadism.
The weight of history in the Muslim imaginary means that the mention of Al Andalus is full of implicit meaning. The targeted public understands perfectly not only to what is being referred to, but also what is the approach of the jihadist groups. Accordingly, the jihad against Spain is justified, not only for Spain's military presence in Afghanistan or its clear support for the U.S. enemy, but also as a legitimate struggle to liberate Islamic land from its Christian occupier. In this sense, the confrontation with Spain goes beyond Spain's policies toward the Muslim world and has a structural character, given that the nation is situated over a territory that by right belongs to Islam and its peoples.

The researchers note that it’s only in the case of Spain that they call it as Al Andalus, the rest of the benighted infidel countries are usually referred to in their current usage names like America, Israel, etc. etc. What really worried me was the ending of the paper and I quote:

In short, one can conclude through analysis of the presence of Spain in jihadist propaganda that independently of the degree of implication of this country in the Islamic world, Spain must endure a threat of structural character that converts it into a perennial target of jihadist terrorism.

While I do not have the data-set, looking at the fulminations that happen in Pakistan and the assorted beards in Pakistan, Kashmir and other unsavoury locations and the arguments made for Spain, there is a chance that India will face threats of a structural character of this ilk. The keyword is stolen. In other words, even if the Kashmir problem is resolved, the threat will only be diminished, not fully removed as long as Al Queda and its compatriots exist. See for example the explanation made for LET at the CFR site. As the BBC reports:

Lashkar's professed ideology went beyond merely challenging Indian rule in Jammu and Kashmir. In a pamphlet entitled "Why Are We Waging Jihad?" the group defined its agenda as the restoration of Islamic rule over all parts of India.

See the word “restoration”? this is what is the operative word. And if more corroboration is required, read this report by Husain Haqqani, the current Pakistani Ambassador to the the Court of Saint Obama. This report talks about the ideologies of South Asian Jihadi Groups.

Exchange Ajmal Kasab for Sarabjit Singh

Vinod Joseph — Sun, 27 Dec 2009 06:45:29 EST

Sarabjit Singh has been sentenced to death and his sentence has been upheld by Pakistan's Supreme Court. Sarabjit has been convicted for carrying out bomb attacks in Pakistan. According to the Pakistanis, Sarabjit is an Indian spy. Sarabjit, on the other hand, claims that he is just a villager who strayed across the border after having had one too many. In the world of espionage, if a diplomat is caught spying, s/he is expelled. Diplomatic immunity is something which non-diplomat spies have. If caught, they are usually disowned and left to their own fate.

There are exceptions of course. Jonathan Pollard was a Jewish man working as an analyst for the American Naval intelligence. Caught spying for Israel, he was sentenced for life and continues to be in prison in the United States. For many years, Israel denied all official ties to him, though Pollard managed to get Israeli citizenship while in prison. However, the High Court of Israel ordered the Israeli government to admit that Pollard was its agent. Ever since then, the Israeli government has been trying to free Pollard, but the US has refused to let him go. Israeli has always done more than most other countries in getting in nationals back home. At present it is bargaining with Hamas over a deal that will see the release of almost a thousand Hamas militants for a single Israeli soldier held by Hamas. Pollard is apparently not very happy with this, but then you can’t please everyone.

Even if India doesn’t concede that Kasab was spying for India, there is no denying that he is an Indian national and nothing prevents India from doing more to get him home. The traditional (and generally speaking, the only way) of obtaining the release of someone in Sarabjit’s position is to exchange him for someone else. India has a mixed record in exchanging prisoners for its people held in custody elsewhere. When Rubaiya Sayeed (daughter of Mufti Muhammad Sayeed, India’s first Muslim Home Minister in the V.P. Singh government) was kidnapped by the Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front, India released five militants to secure her release, despite the objections of Farooq Abdullah’s state government. Years later, a BJP led government released three top militants so that the hijackers of an Indian Airlines plane taken to Kandahar would let their hostages go. One of the militants released was Maulana Masood Azhar, the founder of Jaish-e-Mohammad. However, India hasn’t been able to secure the release of PoWs from the 1971 war who are reportedly still held in Pakistani jails.

I want to see Sarabjit released and sent home to India. I don’t know if he was a spy or just a villager who got drunk and lost his way. The Indian government has made various appeals for his release, but can’t it do more I wonder. Is there any Pakistani national in an Indian jail, one held to be a spy by India and renounced by Pakistan, who can be exchanged for Sarabjit? I don’t know. However, I know that India has custody of a Pakistani national who goes by the name Mohammed Ajmal Amīr Kasāb. Kasab is currently undergoing trial in India for having taken part in the November 2008 Mumbai attacks. Caught on CCTV, the case against Kasab appears to be an open and shut case and a death sentence seems to be very likely. After initial denials, the Pakistani government has conceded that Kasab is a Pakistani national, but it maintains that no Pakistani agency was involved in the planning or execution of the Mumbai attacks last year.

What would be the reaction if the Indian government offers to exchange Kasab for Sarabjit? The Pakistani government is likely to refuse. Sarabjit the official Indian spy has nothing to do with Kasab the Pakistani freelancer who fought for an Islamic militant organisation which is at war with Pakistan at the moment, Pakistan is likely to say. Kasab himself might not want to be exchanged for Sarabjit. However, just as there are many Indians who would like to see Sarabjit return home, there could be many Pakistanis who like the idea of exchanging Kasab for Sarabjit. Kasab was a pawn in a larger game. I don’t doubt for a moment that he is guilty as charged and deserves no leniency. However, if by giving him up, India could secure Sarabjit’s release, it should, in my opinion, do so immediately without wasting a moment.

Ladies and Gentlemen, Sarabjit is due to be executed soon. There are still a few good people working for his release. If you were to lend your support to his cause, he might still make it home.

Mdantsane Spaza - Poems of Mdantsane

Amitabh Mitra — Thu, 10 Dec 2009 09:28:33 EST

the somali spaza shop at street corner
mdantsane
beckons
the needy
cramped within
it too waits for
a stray bullet
or a
stab
violence is islamic
in distant african shores
death
has no color
here
in peaceful
mdantsane
only the muezzins strange strain
sets a few birds
to flight.

Poem and Drawing by Amitabh Mitra