Indo-US Nuclear Deal: Lessons in International Negotiation

Much has been made of the US-Indian Civilian Nuclear deal, with major concerns raised on both sides. The Americans worry that the agreement will undermine the nuclear non-proliferation regime, while contributing to India's nuclear arsenal. Indians conversely have been worried that this deal ties India's foreign policy to that of America and will restrict either the civilian or nuclear programs, or both. These misgivings notwithstanding, the deal has made it through several congressional hurdles in America.

This is clearly the most significant foreign policy deal for India in recent times, and presents a good case study for Indian policy makers. In particular, how exactly did India get a deal that, by most accounts, gives it more than it takes away? And what are the lessons in international relations that India can draw from it?

This analysis is important regardless of whether the deal is eventually passed by the US parliament, and independent of its merits or demerits. It highlights four negotiation strategies that Indian policy makers would do well to study and reuse.

Changing the Frame of Reference

In the recent debates within the US Congress on this deal, two shifts can be identified.

First, a clear case has been made that the deal does not undermine non-proliferation. The following analysis by the Carnegie Endowment, for instance, makes clear that the deal has no impact on India's potential military nuclear program, while having a significant, positive, impact on the civilian program.

The other, more important shift has come because the deal is increasingly viewed not in isolation, but as it was originally envisaged - as part of a larger 'realignment' of US-Indian interests. And much of this commentary has come from highly respected quarters:

• America's New Strategic Partner by Ashton B. Carter in a Special Issue of Foreign Affairs (July/August 2006).


• Misfiring at the India Nuclear Deal, by Seema Gahlaut (Foreign Policy, February 2006).
  
• Faulty Promises: The US-India Nuclear Deal by George Perkovich (Carnegie Endowment, September 2005).


• India as a New Global Power: An Action Agenda for the United States by Ashley J. Tellis (Carnegie Endowment, 2005).

This is an advocacy strategy, whether executed consciously or not. Essentially, the negotiation strategy has changed the frame of reference in which the debate occurs. And in this new frame it becomes politically untenable to criticize the deal too much, for it would mean criticizing the desirability of strong US-India relations.

In an MBA paper in 2005 I had analyzed advocacy strategies surrounding the TRIPS negotiations - first in 1995 and then again in 2001. As in those two cases, here advocacy has been influential because of three elements:

• The right normative framing: the deal is about Indo-US ties.
• A convergence of interests: Indian and US political elites, and the US nuclear business lobby.
• The existence of policy entrepreneurs: most notably Mr. Bush in this case.

Negotiating under Constraints

On the face of it, this deal is surprising. It provides India with significant short-term gains, while limiting our commitments to the medium and long-term. India will get upfront access to civilian nuclear technology. It will also get de-facto nuclear power status. It will reciprocate, in the medium-term and with few binding commitments, by supporting the FMCT and other non-proliferation initiatives of the US.

How did this come about? Simply because the presence of strong domestic constraints meant that India could not agree to immediate steps that would make the deal unpopular, such as signing the CTBT or capping our weapons program. As I learnt in my course on conflict & negotiation, a weak state, with strong domestic constraints cannot give up too much. Our weakness, then, was our strength.

The Internal Institutional Perspective in IR

It has been recognized that suspicion of the deal runs high within the bureaucratic institutions of both countries. The deal, then, was clinched not by including but rather excluding those institutions from the negotiations. In the US, the deal was defined by a few high-ranking members of the State Department. Including other agencies would have simply slowed down the process.

What this highlights is that an institutional perspective is essential to understand whom to speak to, and equally, whom not to speak to.

Creating New Institutions - The Dog That Did Not Bark

Finally, and most importantly, it is essential for India to recognize what the deal did not attempt to do - or the proverbial dog that did not bark. The deal gives India many of the rights and responsibilities of nuclear weapons states of the NPT. Yet, it expressly does not attempt to include India within the NPT, since that would be virtually impossible. Rather, it creates a parallel mechanism or 'institution'.

To draw a parallel, the World Trade Organization came into existence in 1995, when the four major trading groups - the EU, Japan, USA, and Canada - signed four agreements (GATT, GATS, TRIPS, and the framework agreement). Why did the Quad not reform the GATT, which the WTO replaced? Because the many members of the GATT made it difficult to do so. Instead, by signing these four agreements, the Quad required all developing (and hence weaker) nations to either sign on to the WTO in its entirety or forgo the perceived benefits of free trade - a much less appealing alternative. That, essentially, is how the unpopular TRIPS agreement was signed.

The lesson then is that major powers have the ability to create new institutions that suit their purpose. International institutions, such as the NPT, WTO, or the UN, while providing a negotiating platform are first and foremost, a reflection of the international balance of power and not a driver of it.

Concluding Lessons for India at the United Nations

I will close on this last point, as it is particularly important for India's misguided efforts to gain a permanent seat at the United Nations. It is wishful thinking to believe that the existing 5 members will dilute their powers by adding more members that wield the veto. Nor will they voluntarily give up their own veto powers. It is silly of India, still only an emerging power, to think it can sit on the same table.

In fact, I would argue that India should not even want to be on that table. It reflects the balance of power not as it will be in 20 years, but as it was 60 years ago.

India must, therefore, bide its time concentrating on becoming an established power. When that happens, India will be able to change the United Nations or fashion a new institution in its place. India's commitment to the UN may be based on principles of equity and justice. But its engagement must be tempered with the understanding that the UN is a means to an end, not the end in itself. And that recognition of India's status in the UN will follow - with some time lag - its achieving great power status.